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Key points 
India is an emerging player on the global stage, thanks to its growing economy and its strategic role in 
Asia as a balancing power. The EU cannot ignore India’s rise, especially given its own aspiration to be an 
effective global actor – a status that unfortunately the EU has not yet attained. Nevertheless, EU–India 
relations have stagnated, confined to an economic and bureaucratic nature, and need to recover 
momentum. The EU should therefore nurture the current relations and intensify its efforts in the 
medium term, working towards a reconciliation of the different priorities. 
To strengthen the EU–India partnership, the EU should also address the lack of understanding on the 
part of member states, by convincing them and their industries of the added value of collectively 
cooperating with India on issues of common concern, and on the part of India, by demonstrating the 
benefits of dealing with the EU as a counterpart. The EU could thereby improve its credibility as a 
partner and create a conducive political space with India, in which European business would also gain. 
General recommendations 
For the European Commission and the European External Action Service, in order to enhance the EU’s added value 
In relation to EU member states, 
 raise awareness among member states of the added value of negotiating as a collective power 
instead of bilaterally; and 
 coordinate the engagement of European business in specific projects in India. 
In relation to India, leverage the EU’s soft power, more specifically, 
 valorise the EU’s strengths; 
 boost public diplomacy, including through the appointment of two permanent diplomatic 
attachés to the EU Delegation (one cultural and one public); 
 better explain the EU’s foreign policy;  
 promote track 2 and 1.5 dialogues; 
 facilitate youth and research mobility; and 
 encourage the Indian media to set up foreign correspondents in Brussels. 
For the European External Action Service and the European Commission, in order to create a political space 
 Increase the frequency and magnitude of high-level exchanges, including scheduling a visit by 
the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP). 
 Have the chairman of the EU Military Committee accompany the HR/VP at high-level visits. 
 Further develop policy dialogues. 
 Appoint  perman nt s curity advisor to the EU Delegation. 
2 | STEFANIA BENAGLIA 
1. Introduction 
Following initial enthusiasm after the launch of 
the strategic partnership in 2004,1 relations 
between the EU and India have lost energy. The 
EU now plays a marginal role in India’s 
strategic thinking. The two parties hold several 
policy dialogues (on disarmament, 
counterterrorism, counter-piracy and cyber 
security) but these have been confined to 
bureaucratic exchanges, in which the 
counterparts engage without much commitment 
or therefore progress. Unfortunately, up to now 
the EU has failed to consider the geopolitical 
importance of relations with India, especially in 
the broader Asian context, where a new Great 
Game is being played. 
The upcoming EU–India summit on 30 March 
2016 is an opportunity to raise the level of the 
policy dialogues, inject political commitment 
and start building a more effective strategic 
partnership. The EU Global Strategy on Foreign 
and Security Policy, which is due to be 
presented to the European Council in June, 
should also reflect upon how to strengthen EU–
India ties in the future. 
2. What kind of partner is India for 
the EU? 
When India imagines world powers in 30 years, 
it envisages itself sitting at a table with the US, 
China and Russia – there is no chair for Brussels. 
Indeed, the EU struggles to pose as a security 
actor and such a lack of assertiveness leads to 
diminished credibility and attracts little interest 
in cooperation.2 Relations that are less than rosy 
on the political side look the same from an 
economic perspective, which is usually the core 
                                                     
1 See “Strategic Partnership: The European Union and 
India”, Delegation of the European Union to India 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/eu_india/politi
cal_relations/strategic_partnership/index_en.htm).  
2 Samir Saran, “The European Union as a security actor: 
View from India”, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
Bonn, March 2014. 
of EU relations with third countries.3 The EU 
bloc remains India’s largest trade and 
investment partner, but bilateral trade in goods 
has been stagnating in the last five years, at 
around €80 billion. The stock of EU foreign 
direct investment in India (€36 billion in 2012)4 
is still limited compared with that of other big 
economies: China and Hong Kong have 
attracted more than €250 billion, Russia €193 
billion and Brazil €257 billion of EU investment. 
The negotiations for a Broad-based Trade and 
Investment Agreement (BTIA), which started in 
2007, have been stalled since 2013. 
The reasons that led the EU to look for a 
strategic partnership 12 years ago hold even 
truer today:5 India is a partner that cannot be 
overlooked given its geography, demographics, 
economy, military and nuclear power status. 
Thanks to its position – notably as a potential 
balancing power against China and as a 
stabilising one in the unstable South Asian 
region – along with its internal market of 1.25 
billion people and economic growth of around 
7% a year for the last five years,6 India has a big 
role to play in the Asian context. Yet the current 
standstill in Indian regional and international 
affairs has to shift. The dilemmas for India’s 
external strategy are multiple: Rapprochement 
or continued animosity towards Pakistan? What 
stance to take on Afghanistan? How to avoid 
encirclement by China, which holds good 
relations with Pakistan, Iran and Sri Lanka, and 
controls the source of the Brahmaputra River in 
the north-east? How to deepen links with Russia 
without risking the good relationship with the 
                                                     
3 Thomas Renard, “The EU’s strategic partnership 
agreements: Balancing geo-economics and geopolitics”, 
Egmont, Brussels, June 2015. 
4 See “Direct investment outward stocks by main 
destination”, Knoema.com 
(http://knoema.com/tec00052/direct-investment-
outward-stocks-by-main-destination). 
5 Javier Solana, “The European Union and India”, 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., August 2014 
(http://www.brookings.in/the-european-union-and-
india/). 
6 See “GDP growth (annual %)”, World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.K
D.ZG). 
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US? Moving towards a more assertive stance 
under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 
government (which took office in May 2014), 
New Delhi now feels it can pick and choose its 
partners. Countries such as the US, Russia, 
Japan, Israel and Australia are courting India to 
strengthen their respective economic and 
political ties. The EU should pay more attention 
to this ongoing race and be competing.  
However, given the reality of ongoing EU–India 
relations, and the fact that India is a low priority 
for the EU, aiming today at a full-fledged, 
highly effective partnership with India may be 
unrealistic. India certainly shares a wider 
neighbourhood in-between and is an important 
geostrategic actor, but it currently does not 
share the priorities of the EU. It is important to 
manage expectations – such relations cannot be 
overhauled in a matter of a few months. The EU 
should focus on what is achievable given the 
current tools at its disposal. Many of the 
prospective gains could be achieved through 
enhancing soft power, i.e. projection of the EU’s 
added value in the fields of public diplomacy, 
culture and coordination of the economic 
interests of EU member states.  
Still, the divergence of priorities and the present 
geostrategic equilibrium may well change in the 
medium term. The EU should therefore nurture 
the relations and intensify its efforts, working 
towards a reconciliation of priorities. The 
aspiration should be to overcome differences 
and transform common values into common 
interests.7 Through today’s efforts, the EU–India 
strategic partnership could be strengthened 
whenever the need arises and generate the 
benefits of closer cooperation.  
3. What are the gains for the EU? 
A stronger partnership with India would benefit 
the EU’s foreign policy – without compromising 
on immediate interests – by augmenting the 
                                                     
7 See the remarks of the head of the EU Delegation to India, 
Ambassador Tomasz Kozlowski, “EU, India to hold 
summit-level meeting in 2016”, Business Standard, 16 
December 2015.  
EU’s global standing and power projection. By 
proving its ability to engage in solid and 
diversified partnerships with strategic partners 
and global actors, the EU would enhance its 
credibility as an effective actor. By establishing 
good relations in the security field with strategic 
partners in Asia, such as India, the EU would 
also advance its foreign policy to a more mature 
stage. 
By shifting the paradigm of EU–India relations 
and reinforcing the partnership, the EU could 
benefit from India’s growing market – in ways 
similar to those pursued by countries such as 
the US and Israel. The EU, as a union of member 
states, would profit from deeper, more fruitful 
cooperation, boosting European industry 
through access to India’s expanding market. 
This would certainly create a more favourable 
context for negotiations on the BTIA, unleash 
the economic opportunities it holds and open 
India’s domestic market – which has great 
potential for further growth, especially if the 
government in New Delhi is able to bring about 
its programme of reforms. 
While waiting for the conclusion of an 
ambitious trade agreement, current European 
business operations in India would be greatly 
supported. The European defence sector in 
particular is export-oriented – partly owing to 
cuts in the defence budgets of member states 
and rising competition from growing economies 
like China’s – and therefore keen on entering 
third countries’ markets. India is a perfect 
candidate, not only because of its market 
potential (it is the world’s largest arms 
importer),8 but also because it shares 
fundamental democratic values. Defence 
cooperation involves a strong political 
dimension and is an indication of a close mutual 
understanding of the geopolitical environment. 
By stepping up EU–India collaboration and 
creating a conducive political space, the EU 
                                                     
8 See “Arms Imports (SIPRI trend indicator values)”, World 
Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.MPRT.KD
?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi
_data_value-last&sort=desc). 
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could also facilitate European defence 
cooperation with India’s government and 
industrial sector. The EU could therefore 
assume a role, inspired by the US model, 
through which it uses its political weight to back 
shortlisted EU firms when negotiating with the 
Indian government, contributing to a positive 
outcome.9  
4. What would India gain? 
Closer political cooperation would have a 
positive effect on the growth of India’s 
economy, which is the primary focus of the new 
coalition government, the National Democratic 
Alliance. The EU, being India’s largest trade 
partner and investor, is the prime choice as a 
source of know-how and investment. In a 
context of deeper cooperation, India could 
benefit from EU coordination of investors for 
big infrastructural projects. It could also take 
better advantage of the size of European 
industry – especially in the defence sector – to 
diversify its imports, and eventually establish a 
strong manufacturing base of its own through 
the knowledge acquired,10 in line with the goal 
of the much-publicised Make in India 
programme.11  
India, through closer security cooperation with 
the EU, which has different priorities but no 
conflicting interests, would also reinforce its 
stature as a global actor – instrumental to its bid 
for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. 
5. How to strengthen the EU–India 
partnership 
In spite of a long history of relations between 
India and individual EU member states, there is 
                                                     
9 Stefania Benaglia, EU–India defence cooperation, IAI, Rome, 
2016. 
10 Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, India and the EU: What 
opportunities for defence cooperation?, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2015. 
11 See “Make in India: Defence Manufacturing” 
(http://www.makeinindia.com/sector/defence-
manufacturing). 
a profound lack of knowledge and 
understanding between India and the EU, which 
exacerbates the reciprocal underrating of each 
other’s potential. India’s lack of interest can be 
ascribed mainly to the absence of a fundamental 
understanding and basic knowledge of the EU 
and its functioning, also resulting from little 
exposure to EU affairs. The complexity and 
potential of the EU as a global actor and 
strategic partner has yet to be grasped by India 
to a full degree. 
This flawed approach is mutual, however, as 
there is a lack of understanding of India’s 
potential by the EU, coupled with low 
expectations by member states of the EU’s 
added value compared with the option of 
conducting bilateral relations. To remedy this 
situation, the EU should work on two equally 
important fronts: i) convincing member states of 
the added value of acting as a bloc, by 
accentuating the EU’s value as a coordinator, 
and ii) demonstrating to India the advantages of 
dealing with the EU as a collective actor, by 
leveraging its soft power. To do so, the EU 
should implement a series of measures to raise 
its profile and create a conducive political space. 
5.1 Raise the EU’s standing as an effective 
partner 
To bridge the awareness gap within the EU and 
increase member state expectations of the added 
value of working through and with the EU, the 
EU’s multiplier effect should be further 
demonstrated.  
Accentuating the EU’s added value. Concluding 
negotiations with India can be a real challenge 
because of its lack of transparency in 
administrative procedures. The EU should raise 
awareness among member states of the added 
value of dialogue with India as a bloc through 
EU coordination (rather than acting bilaterally) 
on issues of common concern. Reflecting the 
peculiarities and challenges posed by India, 
member states’ leverage is indeed multiplied 
when coordinated compared with individual 
member state undertakings. Unfortunately, 
there are not many examples of coordination 
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yet, partly because of member states’ sceptical 
approach towards the added value of the EU. 
One of the few examples is the successful 
coordination of the Indo–European Water 
Forum, which facilitates the contributions of 
member states and European companies to the 
Indian government-led Clean Ganga initiative.12 
Several other initiatives are pending, and if the 
related agreements are successfully concluded 
they could deliver a positive multiplier effect, 
such as in aviation, for which the Horizontal 
Aviation Agreement was signed in 2008 but is 
still awaiting ratification. In addition, there is 
the Common Agenda on Migration and 
Mobility, which was proposed by the EU to 
India in 2013, and the cooperation on civil 
nuclear energy as per the bilateral agreement 
Euratom–India, which has been signed but is 
not yet in force. The EU could identify more 
potential projects and areas of cooperation and 
could coordinate with member states, thereby 
facilitating access to India’s market by European 
firms/entities in those specific sectors.  
The EU should also prove its added value to 
European business, besides its continual 
engagement in trying to resolve the various 
market access issues that characterise India’s 
market (relatively high custom duties, standards 
and regulations that are rarely harmonised to 
international standards, retroactive taxation, 
weak protection of intellectual property rights 
and so on). One way to do so is to create 
platforms to facilitate coordination between 
European companies and consortia seeking 
investment opportunities in India, especially in 
the context of the many programmes backed by 
the Indian government, through which 
investment by technologically advanced 
companies is encouraged (at least on paper).13 
                                                     
12 See “Indo-European Water Forum Discusses Major EU-
India Partnership in Water Sector”, 23-24 November 2015, 
New Delhi, Press Release 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/documents/pr
ess_release_indoeuropeanwaterforum.pdf). 
13 Among these are the previously mentioned Make in 
India programme, but also the Smart Cities initiative in the 
urban development sector, or Digital India, which aims at 
improving online infrastructure and increasing Internet 
The platforms could offer intelligence and 
counselling to companies willing to participate 
in these initiatives. Such action would be greatly 
helped by the active representation of European 
companies’ interests through an effective EU 
chamber of commerce, which would 
complement and coordinate the activities of the 
bilateral chambers of commerce. Another 
approach is to offer political backing when 
European companies are facing serious 
challenges from Indian authorities: this could 
happen mostly in procedures of public 
procurement, which usually involve large 
financial resources and may include companies 
from more member states. The EU, by 
leveraging its aggregate weight, could be more 
effective than individual member states. As 
mentioned, this could be particularly potent in 
the defence sector, where India’s government 
seems to give more credence to government-to-
government dynamics than to those at the 
government-to-business level. 
5.2 Leverage the EU’s soft power  
By further explaining the EU’s functioning, the 
added value of dialogue with the EU as a union 
would be clear. To demonstrate to India the 
benefits of dealing with the EU as a collective 
actor, the EU should leverage its soft power. 
This could be achieved by valorising the EU’s 
strengths, enhancing public diplomacy, better 
explaining the EU’s foreign policy, promoting 
track 2 and 1.5 dialogues, facilitating youth and 
research mobility and encouraging the Indian 
media to set up foreign correspondents in 
Brussels. 
Valorising the EU’s strengths. The EU should 
capitalise on its soft power and advance its use 
by valorising its strengths, such as the EU’s 
economic power, as both an institution and a 
union of member states, the EU’s capacity to 
reach consensus and the Indian diaspora living 
and working in the EU. Indeed, despite the EU 
                                                                                       
connectivity, or again the building of five industrial 
corridors between India’s major industrial cities. 
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being the world’s largest economy,14 in a survey 
conducted by the Pew Research Centre on 
“How Indians see the world”, the EU was not 
viewed by the interviewees as a global power, 
with only 1% considering the combined 
“countries of the European Union” a leading 
economic power (compared with 3% regarding 
Japan, 10% China and 66% the US as leading 
economies).15 The EU should also valorise its 
role as a normative power and its unique skill of 
legislative coordination among member states. 
Undeniably, India suffers from the 
fragmentation of its 29 states, which often have 
conflicting interests and do not share a common 
agenda. Hence, India observes with interest the 
capacities that the EU has acquired to harmonise 
its market and reach consensus among member 
states and various stakeholders. Finally, the EU 
should also explore and activate the potential of 
the Indian diaspora working and living in the 
EU – which is the second largest after that living 
in the US. 
Enhancing public diplomacy. The EU should 
also increase its visibility and reach out to the 
Indian public to improve understanding of the 
EU’s unique nature and potential. EU public 
diplomacy is mainly financed through the 
Partnership Instrument. Thanks to the 
restructuring of the instrument, as of 2017 the 
EU should be able to step up its work towards 
these objectives, particularly owing to an 
increased mobilisation of its funds. The EU 
Delegation in India should also be supported by 
two diplomatic attachés (one public and one 
cultural) – working in conjunction with the 
member state embassies in New Delhi – to 
increase the visibility and understanding of the 
EU. Towards this aim, several other actions 
could be undertaken, such as improving 
coordination with member state cultural 
institutes, exploring possibilities for cooperation 
and exchange between Indian and European 
artists as well as universities and training 
                                                     
14 See World Bank, “Gross domestic product 2014, PPP”; 
the figure for the European Union is calculated by the sum 
of individual countries. 
15 Bruce Stokes, The Modi Bounce, Pew Research Center, 
Washington, D.C., September 2015.  
institutes in various fields, and encouraging 
people-to-people initiatives and dialogue among 
civil society organisations.  
The EU should also pay more attention to the 
explanation of its foreign policy. A good lesson 
could be learned from how the Ukraine crisis 
has been perceived in South Asia. India widely 
subscribes to the Russian narrative of the crisis – 
notably that the EU has pushed its borders 
eastwards and Russia can do nothing but 
defend its sphere of influence. The EU should 
ensure that its voice is heard when its actions 
and policies are discussed. 
Promoting track 2 and 1.5 dialogues.16 To 
facilitate the identification of common interests, 
improve understanding and generate new ideas 
for how the EU–India partnership could evolve 
in the future, track 2 and track 1.5 initiatives 
should be promoted. EU–India forums should 
proliferate, including boosting the one 
sponsored by the EU Institute for Security 
Studies in its capacity as the Union’s agency. 
These forums should reach out to a much wider 
range of Indian actors and raise awareness of 
EU actions in the security realm and possibilities 
for cooperation. The track 2 and track 1.5 
initiatives, coupled with improved think tank 
and academic exchanges, would also go a long 
way towards helping European industry to 
understand Indian foreign and security policy.  
In addition, youth and research mobility should 
be increased. Scholars’ mobility should be 
facilitated in the context of Erasmus+ and Marie 
Curie programmes to encourage careers based 
on knowledge of the EU system; currently only 
a handful of Indian scholars have expertise and 
knowledge of the EU’s institutions and 
functioning. 
                                                     
16 Track 2 diplomacy refers to unofficial dialogue and 
problem-solving activities aimed at building relationships 
and encouraging new thinking that can inform the official 
process. Track 2 activities typically involve influential 
academic, religious and NGO leaders and other civil 
society actors who can interact more freely than high-
ranking officials. Track 1.5 diplomacy denotes situations in 
which official and non-official actors work together to 
resolve conflicts. 
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Encouraging Indian media coverage. Indian 
media tend to focus more on the EU’s financial 
crisis and its multicultural problems than its 
success as an institution.17 This is partly because 
much analysis of the EU rests on secondary 
source assessments from a Eurosceptic British 
press.18 The EU should therefore encourage the 
Indian media to set up foreign correspondents 
in Brussels, following EU affairs from a 
headquarters perspective and increasing 
institutional understanding. 
5.3 Create a political space 
To strengthen the partnership, the EU should 
not only improve the perception of its potential, 
but also create a political space with India – 
similar to what the US and Israel have created – 
leading to a closer, more beneficial partnership 
and an enhanced capacity to politically leverage 
the dialogue with the Indian government. The 
upcoming EU–India Summit is certainly an 
opportunity to prove the European interest in 
stepping up the engagement with India through 
a number of possible actions, as elaborated 
below.  
Increasing high-level visits. The frequency and 
magnitude of exchanges should be intensified. 
As India entertains regular and frequent 
exchanges with numerous member states and 
non-EU countries, the EU should also engage in 
equally frequent high-level meetings and high-
profile visits – primarily by the HR/VP, whose 
last visit dates back to January 2012.19 These 
meetings have the potential to create the 
political space conducive to a stronger 
partnership.  
To boost the EU’s credibility as a global security 
actor, the chairman of the EU Military 
Committee (EUMC) should also be regularly 
                                                     
17 Gulshan Sachdeva, Evaluation of the EU-India Strategic 
Partnership and the potential for its revitalization, Directorate-
General for External Policies, European Parliament, 
Brussels, July 2015. 
18 See Saran (2014), op. cit. 
19 Enrico D’Ambrogio, India’s bilateral relations: First year of 
the Narendra Modi era, European Parliamentary Research 
Service, Brussels, July 2015. 
present at high-level meetings. The immediately 
recognisable role and expertise of the EUMC 
would facilitate India’s defence counterpart in 
engaging and smoothing the security dialogue 
and cooperation.  
High-level meetings should encompass all areas 
of cooperation; therefore, it is fundamental that 
the European Commission promotes more visits 
by its commissioners to discuss specific matters, 
such as trade and investment, energy, the 
environment, urban development, transport, IT 
research and so on. As an example, a yearly 
economic summit at ministerial level would 
foster a better environment for European 
investment by providing a political impetus to 
remove the several barriers that European 
investors face when entering India’s market. 
Further developing policy dialogues. The EU–
India partnership could be revitalised by 
proactively extending areas where cooperation 
is already established and where India 
recognises the EU as an effective partner. This 
happens in both multilateral contexts (e.g. 
counter-piracy missions, such as the Contact 
Group on piracy off the coast of Somalia) and 
bilateral ones, such as the EU–India Human 
Rights Dialogue.20 In other fields, the EU and 
India have established a political dialogue 
where an agreement has yet to be reached, as in 
the case of migration. The significance of these 
dialogues cannot be underestimated: if India 
perceives the EU as a valuable counterpart in 
such delicate matters, it will gradually open up 
to cooperation in more fields (e.g. defence and 
security and climate change). Of course, 
expectations have to be carefully managed, 
because the success of these initiatives also 
depends on India’s political interest and 
structural capacity for usefully conducting the 
discussions.  
It would be desirable, however, for the 
upcoming EU–India summit to strengthen 
cooperation on issues of common concern – 
such as intensifying existing policy dialogues on 
                                                     
20 The EU is the only partner with whom India holds a 
dialogue on human rights. 
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disarmament, counterterrorism, counter-piracy 
and cyber security from bureaucratic exchanges 
to effective policy dialogues capable of 
delivering results.  
Appointing a security advisor. A security 
advisor should be permanently posted to the EU 
Delegation to liaise with the Indian military and 
defence sector. The security advisor would be 
the initial contact point for interaction and 
guidance on security cooperation. In 
conjunction with bilateral embassies – which 
often task their military, trade or defence 
attachés with promoting their domestic defence 
industry and support it during negotiations – 
the EU security advisor would similarly support 
the European defence industry and consortia in 
negotiations with India. In addition, a security 
advisor is a prerequisite for asserting the EU’s 
stance as a security actor, and for 
institutionalising EU–India security cooperation 
and discussions on potential collaboration on 
EU missions and operations. 
6. Conclusions 
In essence, in its relations with India the EU 
needs to enhance its added value for the 
member states and show India the benefits of 
dealing with the EU as a collective counterpart. 
It should reinvigorate the currently stagnating 
relations into a partnership capable of deeper 
cooperation when needed. To do so, the EU’s 
soft power should be leveraged by valorising its 
strengths, boosting public diplomacy, better 
explaining its foreign policy, promoting track 2 
and 1.5 dialogues, facilitating youth and 
research mobility and encouraging the Indian 
media to set up foreign correspondents in 
Brussels. In addition, a conducive political space 
should be created through increasing the 
frequency and magnitude of high-level 
exchanges, further developing policy dialogues 
and appointing a permanent security advisor to 
the EU delegation. These actions would also 
help European industry to access India’s 
expanding domestic market. 
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